Analysis also shows that PULP can be used effectively to prevent the newest "Spectre" bug which threats nearly all out-of-order processors.
Introduction
Many scenarios could induce in-process However, they are mostly based on software checking or software enforced range checking. The drawback is, 1. need modify third party code. 2 softwareoverhead is large. 3. can be bypassed by Spectre.
The main cause of in-process vulnerabilities above is that modern processors lack hardware mechanisms to check inner-process memory accesses. Traditional memory protection is based on process address space defined by operating system. Only memory accesses across process domains are checked and prevented if violations are detected. The memory access boundary checking within a process are accomplished by software, which is neither complete nor efficient due the complexity of software.
If we only allow the reliable program codes to access sensitive critical data, we can prevent malicious or buggy untrusted code from inspecting the critical data in advance.
In this paper we propose a novel hardware based in-process isolation system called PULP. PULP modifies the processor pipeline, especially the implementation of load/store instructions, to check whether the inner-memory access address is legal.
PULP separates user process into trusted and untrusted parts, limiting the memory access ranges of untrusted part. PULP inserts the API function before the function calling, which can restrict the data ranges that the called function can access. To separate the trusted functions from untrusted functions, PULP needs also to modify the OS process loader slightly.
When executing the load/store instruction, PULP don't need additional instructions to check the memory address. The software runtime overhead of PULP is negligible compared to Intel MPX.
We use a RISC-V Rocket-chip platform to implement our prototype. We add new registers to the show that, the area of PULP is bigger than the old rocket chip version by 31%, the cells of PULP is more than rocket chip by 2%, the power of PULP is more than rocket chip by 28%.
We choose MIT benchmarks [2] and Heartbleed [3] as our security test benchmarks. The benchmark sources are modified to add range-adjustment APIs.
Experimental results show that PULP can effectively prevent buffer overflow and memory leakage vulnerabilities ahead of time.
We also use SPEC2006 to test the performance of PULP. As the load/store instructions of PULP automatically check the memory access address at runtime, no additional instruction is needed to check the memory address. Results show that PULP incurs low runtime overhead (less than 0.1%) to SPEC2006.
Since Rocket chip is an in-order processor, we cannot reproduce Spectre attack, but the in-process data isolation mechanism of PULP can effectively prevent Spectre, and prohibit the unreliable part of the program from gaining the security sensitive data whether it is invoked by speculation or not.
With PULP we contribute the following:
 We propose a novel inner-process hardware based memory protection mechanism PULP. PULP provides APIs to prevent the secondary functions from accessing critical inner-process memory region.
 We have implemented a prototype system with an enhanced RISC-V CPU core, modified Linux kernel as well as a set of APIs to demonstrate PULP.
 We have testified the PULP prototype by both functional and performance benchmarks. The result shows that PULP can effectively defend buffer overflow and Heartbleed problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: in section 2 we lay out the motivation of PULP. Section 3 gives the design and implementation of PULP.
Section 4 provides the experimental evaluation results. We contrast the related work in section 5 and conclude the paper in section 6.
Motivation

Inner-process Abuse
Inner-process memory abuse ranges from data theft to privilege escalation. Various of user-space attacks can succeed once they have penetrated into targets' process context [8] , as they can freely access (or abuse) target programs' memory content.
Inner-process abuse is usually caused by improper internal memory access, and triggered by many unreliable factors inside user process, such as thirdparty program, improper function parameters, buffer overflow and speculation, etc. Buffer overflow or out of bound memory access are the main source of innerprocess abuse.
Buffers are areas of memory set aside to hold data transited from one function to another. Malformed inputs like an anomalous transaction that produces more data than expected could lead to writes beyond the end of the buffer, which is called Buffer overflows [12] . If the overflow overwrites adjacent data or executable code, it will probably result in erratic program behavior, including memory access errors, incorrect results, and crashes. Recently there are some hardware and software combined methods to achieve inner-process isolation, such as Intel MPX [6] , Dune [7] and Shreds [8] . Among them, Intel MPX has high runtime overhead, and because of cross privilege, Dune has difficulty when sharing data between the trusted and untrusted parts of the process, while Shreds has higher overhead than PULP.
Limitation of existing methods
Main idea of PULP
The main difficulty for inner-process protection is lack of a hardware mechanism to identify different address space within a Process. Previously hardware assumes all code can access the address space of the whole process while leave the software to protect itself. Instead of adding complex hardware domains within a process, PULP chooses to use the address of instruction code to identify a subject. By associating the address of instruction with the data address to be accessed, a protection check can be enforced by hardware with minimum change to the software code.
System design and implementation
Depending on the reliability of each part of process codes, we divided the code region of the process into many segments. In this paper, each code segment is a This rule forbids secondary function to configure SMAR registers, which assures that unreliable code could not change its accessible memory ranges.
To avoid ROP-like attack, PULP add a return address register(RAR) in the CPU core, recording the return address of secondary function. When the secondary function is called, the return address will be stored into RAR. When the secondary function returns, the target PC will be compared with PC stored in RAR, and mismatch of PC will trigger returnaddress-error exception.
With the help of RAR, we can assure the control flow integrity.
processor pipeline
In order to realize the address cross-border judgement, a series of address comparisons are added in the pipeline. If the memory access address or the branch target is beyond the specified range, a corresponding abnormal signal is generated. We take a typical five-stage pipeline as example.
IF (Instruction fetch). An instruction is fetched
from the memory by program counter. Otherwise PC is in the secondary function, checking will be needed in the EX stage.
ID (Instruction decode
)
EX (Execution). According to the results of the ID
stage, if the instruction is LOAD/STORE and it belongs to secondary function, the memory address will be checked, and PULP judges whether it is within legal memory bounds set in SMAR.
If the instruction jumps from primary to secondary function, the return address will be stored into RAR. When running programs, PULP will inquire the SMAR registers to see if the following operations are within the specific memory. In this way, malicious access to memory space would never succeed as they will be prevented by PULP, and raise exception.
The index is needed to indicate specific registers used by the current API.
After invocation of secondary function, end_protect API is invoked to clear a SMAR group specified by index, so that PULP will not check the memory access range anymore.
To prevent secondary functions modifying SMAR registers, special configuration instructions in start_protect and end_protect could only be executed in primary function.
Compiler modification
The compiler computes input parameter's effective data length, and instruments start_protect and 
Security Evaluation
Heartbleed attack
Heartbleed is a security bug in the OpenSSL cryptography library, which is a widely used We implemented a socket server with the API provided by OpenSSL-1.0.1e in C, which initializes the socket, SSL library, and waits for the connection of client using SSL_accept.
We wrote a socket client program in C, to communicate with socket server. The client sends hello request of TLSv1.1 to server, and the connection between server and client will be established.
To replay Heartbleed, we sent a malformed Heartbeat request in client. As expected, the server replies with excess data that may be secret.
After deploying PULP in OpenSSL source code, that is, putting the memcpy invocation in tls1_process_heartbeat under protection, the unexpected copy operation raised an exception and the process is terminated by kernel. Finally no secret data is leaked out.
MIT benchmarks
We also used MIT Lincoln Laboratories buffer overflow benchmark [2] . 
Performance Evaluation
GCC stack protector
To evaluate the API configuration overhead of PULP, we program two micro benchmarks, both of which execute strcpy 10000 times, and the input string length of strcpy is 100.
To compare performance of PULP and stack protector, one program is configured with the PULP API. And another similar program is compiled with GCC option -fstack-protector.
In Figure 2 we compare execution times of PULP and stack protector. The former is 0.29s, the latter is 0.26s. The execution time of stack protector is less.
Which is almost the same as original execution time without any runtime protection. So the configuration time of PULP is less than 15% of the execution time of strcpy function, with the input string length is 100.
The total configuration time of PULP is in proportion to the called times of secondary function and the numbers of function parameters. If the called times of strcpy are fewer, the input string length of strcpy is longer, the configuration overhead in the total execution time will be relatively lower. GCC stack protector need low time overhead.
However, GCC stack protector can protect only stack variables, while PULP can protect heap variables and global variables as well. Table 2 and table 3 give two functional test programs of stack protector. The first micro benchmark protects variable in the stack. The second one protects variable in the heap. 
SPEC2006
In the SPEC2006 benchmarks, we added Table 4 gives the hardware comparison results of old rocket chip and PULP. The area of PULP is bigger than the old rocket chip version by 31%. The cells of PULP is more than rocket chip by 2%. The power of PULP is more than rocket chip by 28%. 
Hardware Cost Evaluation
Comparison of in-process isolation techniques
In Table 5 , we list the features of techniques above, and compare the performance overhead and shortcomings of these techniques. 
